Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Facts of Causation', 'Action' and 'On the Law of War'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
10365 We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
23601 Leaders can only attack foreigners who have done wrong (as with their own subjects) [Vitoria]
23569 The only just cause for a war is a wrong received [Vitoria]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
23566 Princes should not justify a war to their subjects, and doing so would undermine the state [Vitoria]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
23576 Sacking a city is lawful if it motivates the attacking troops [Vitoria]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
4785 Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
8408 Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley]