Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Correspondence Theory of Truth', 'Against 'Ostrich Nominalism'' and 'Frege on Extensions from Concepts'

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12 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
3745 Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
3742 Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
3744 The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor]
3749 What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
3746 Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
3747 Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
8507 Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8506 Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
8505 Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
3743 We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor]
3748 Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
3115 Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal]