19 ideas
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
21006 | If women share rights with men, they will exhibit similar virtues [Wollstonecraft] |
15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |