14 ideas
| 3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
| 22104 | Truth is the conformity of being to intellect [Aquinas] |
| 3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
| 3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
| 3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
| 3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
| 22103 | Being is basic to thought, and all other concepts are additions to being [Aquinas] |
| 3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
| 14633 | How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson] |
| 14635 | An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson] |
| 14632 | Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson] |
| 14631 | How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson] |
| 3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
| 3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |