Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Correspondence Theory of Truth', 'Mr Strawson on Logical Theory' and 'Individuation'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22438 Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
22436 Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
22431 Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
3745 Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
3742 Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
3744 The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor]
3749 What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
22435 The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
22433 It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
3746 Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
22437 Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
22434 Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
3747 Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
8967 Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
8965 Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
22432 Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
3743 We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor]
3748 Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
8968 If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
8966 Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
22430 If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
13713 Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider]