Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'The Establishment of Scientific Semantics' and 'Vagueness: a global approach'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
4037 Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
13338 '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
23548 Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K]
13337 A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
13335 Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski]
13336 A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski]
23539 Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
13339 A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski]
13340 Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
13341 Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
23544 Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K]
23540 Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
23546 Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
23542 Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
23541 Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
4027 Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
4029 Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
23545 We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
23547 It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
4039 Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
23543 We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K]