Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Contingent Identity' and 'On the Nature of Moral Values'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method [Quine]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices [Quine]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself [Quine]