Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Occasions of Identity' and 'New work for a theory of universals'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
8605 In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
4037 Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
8607 Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
8606 A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
8580 Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
8571 Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
10717 Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver]
16217 Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley]
8585 Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis]
8613 Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis]
8586 Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis]
8589 For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis]
15460 All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis]
15726 Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
7031 Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil]
8572 Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
4027 Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18433 There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis]
8604 We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
14499 Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
4029 Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15120 Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
8573 Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8569 I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
21961 Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
8576 The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8570 To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis]
8574 Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
13437 A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16233 Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
14755 Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16231 Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
8579 Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
4039 Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
8615 We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis]
8614 A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8608 Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis]
8584 Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
15727 Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis]
8581 Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
8611 A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis]