Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Sophistical Refutations' and 'On the Philosophy of Logic'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason

2676	Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle]

8952	We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason

2675	Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle]

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor

4037	Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic

2677	Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction [Aristotle]

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic

2674	Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition [Aristotle]

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic

8943	Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic

8945	Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic

8951	Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic

8950	Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and

16967

'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness

8946	We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties

4027	Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties

4029	Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

8944	Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species

16149

Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law

11840

Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle]

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

8941	We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals

8947	If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals

8949	In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation

4039	Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]