Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Letters to Frege' and 'How to Russell a Frege-Church'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell]
Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan]
'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan]
If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]