16 ideas
| 4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
| 13373 | Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G] |
| 13368 | The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G] |
| 13370 | 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G] |
| 13369 | By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G] |
| 13366 | The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G] |
| 13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
| 10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
| 13367 | The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G] |
| 13371 | If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G] |
| 13372 | There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G] |
| 4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
| 9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
| 4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
| 7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
| 4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |