21 ideas
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
21740 | I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell] |
21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
21746 | Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell] |
21747 | Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell] |
21743 | In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell] |
21742 | Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell] |
21745 | Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell] |
21744 | Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell] |
22891 | We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon] |