12 ideas
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
8698 | Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend] |
9557 | Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara] |
10263 | Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |