Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Introduction to 'Evidentialism'' and 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)'

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11 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
4037 Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
4027 Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
4029 Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14330 To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
6498 Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19518 Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5690 A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
5493 If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
4600 Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
4039 Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
19519 Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman]