19 ideas
8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
7306 | If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A] |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
7322 | Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A] |
7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
7324 | Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A] |
7323 | If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A] |
7315 | 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A] |
7328 | The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A] |
7329 | Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A] |
7333 | The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A] |