61 ideas
8927 | Philosophy moves essentially in the element of universality [Hegel] |
21776 | Philosophy aims to reveal the necessity and rationality of the categories of nature and spirit [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
1627 | Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine] |
8935 | Without philosophy, science is barren and futile [Hegel] |
22082 | Truth does not appear by asserting reasons and then counter-reasons [Hegel] |
22035 | The structure of reason is a social and historical achievement [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
8932 | Truth does not come from giving reasons for and against propositions [Hegel] |
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
1623 | Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine] |
7077 | The true is the whole [Hegel] |
9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |
17738 | Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine] |
19492 | Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine] |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
1628 | If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine] |
10929 | Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine] |
12188 | Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge] |
15090 | Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker] |
15611 | I develop philosophical science from the simplest appearance of immediate consciousness [Hegel, by Hegel] |
8928 | The Absolute is not supposed to be comprehended, but felt and intuited [Hegel] |
8929 | In the Absolute everything is the same [Hegel] |
21774 | Genuine idealism is seeing the ideal structure of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
8934 | Being is Thought [Hegel] |
9383 | Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine] |
12424 | Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher] |
9338 | Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine] |
9337 | Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich] |
9340 | Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine] |
21773 | Experience is immediacy, unity, forces, self-awareness, reason, culture, absolute being [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
22033 | Hegel tried to avoid Kant's dualism of neutral intuitions and imposed concepts [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
1620 | Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine] |
1629 | Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine] |
19488 | The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo] |
21771 | Consciousness derives its criterion of knowledge from direct knowledge of its own being [Hegel] |
1625 | Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine] |
20741 | Consciousness is shaped dialectically, by opposing forces and concepts [Hegel, by Aho] |
21770 | Consciousness is both of objects, and of itself [Hegel] |
5647 | Hegel claims knowledge of self presupposes desire, and hence objects [Hegel, by Scruton] |
5648 | For Hegel knowledge of self presupposes objects, and also a public and moral social world [Hegel, by Scruton] |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
1626 | It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine] |
7317 | 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A] |
1621 | Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine] |
9371 | Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine] |
1622 | Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine] |
9366 | Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian] |
14473 | Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson] |
7321 | The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine] |
8803 | Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine] |
17737 | The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins] |
1624 | If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine] |
8930 | The in-itself must become for-itself, which requires self-consciousness [Hegel] |
8936 | Human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds [Hegel] |
22034 | Modern life needs individuality, but must recognise that human agency is social [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
21987 | History is the progress of the consciousness of freedom [Hegel] |
8931 | The movement of pure essences constitutes the nature of scientific method [Hegel] |
8933 | Science confronts the inner necessities of objects [Hegel] |
21775 | The God of revealed religion can only be understood through pure speculative knowledge [Hegel] |
6917 | God is the essence of thought, abstracted from the thinker [Hegel, by Feuerbach] |
6915 | Hegel made the last attempt to restore Christianity, which philosophy had destroyed [Hegel, by Feuerbach] |