17 ideas
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
13174 | A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz] |
13175 | Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz] |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
13172 | What we cannot imagine may still exist [Leibniz] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
13173 | Death is just the contraction of an animal [Leibniz] |