14 ideas
| 4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
| 14742 | It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N] |
| 4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
| 4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
| 15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
| 15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
| 15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
| 15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
| 15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
| 15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
| 4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
| 18885 | Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N] |
| 15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
| 15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |