85 ideas
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
2653 | If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, the whole universe must also be subject to it [Cicero] |
3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle] |
3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle] |
3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle] |
3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin] |
3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle] |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle] |
3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle] |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle] |
3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle] |
3482 | Perception is a function of expectation [Searle] |
3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle] |
3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle] |
3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle] |
3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle] |
3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle] |
3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle] |
3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle] |
3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle] |
3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle] |
3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle] |
3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle] |
3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle] |
4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle] |
3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle] |
3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle] |
3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle] |
3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
2628 | Why would mind mix with matter if it didn't need it? [Cicero] |
3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle] |
3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle] |
3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle] |
3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle] |
3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle] |
3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle] |
3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle] |
9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford] |
3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle] |
3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle] |
3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle] |
3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle] |
3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle] |
3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle] |
3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle] |
3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle] |
20814 | Eloquence educates, exhorts, comforts, distracts and unites us, and raises us from savagery [Cicero] |
3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle] |
3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle] |
2640 | We have the death penalty, but still have thousands of robbers [Cicero] |
2652 | Some regard nature simply as an irrational force that imparts movement [Cicero] |
3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle] |
3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle] |
2645 | Why shouldn't the gods fear their own destruction? [Cicero] |
3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle] |
2627 | I wonder whether loss of reverence for the gods would mean the end of all virtue [Cicero] |
2651 | God doesn't obey the laws of nature; they are subject to the law of God [Cicero] |
2634 | It seems clear to me that we have an innate idea of the divine [Cicero] |
2636 | Many primitive people know nothing of the gods [Cicero] |
2650 | If a person cannot feel the power of God when looking at the stars, they are probably incapable of feeling [Cicero] |
2647 | It is obvious from order that someone is in charge, as when we visit a gymnasium [Cicero] |
2655 | If the barbarians of Britain saw a complex machine, they would be baffled, but would know it was designed [Cicero] |
2656 | Chance is no more likely to create the world than spilling lots of letters is likely to create a famous poem [Cicero] |
2657 | If everything with regular movement and order is divine, then recurrent illnesses must be divine [Cicero] |
2638 | Either the gods are identical, or one is more beautiful than another [Cicero] |
2635 | The gods are happy, so virtuous, so rational, so must have human shape [Cicero] |
2641 | Why believe in gods if you have never seen them? [Cicero] |
2659 | The lists of good men who have suffered and bad men who have prospered are endless [Cicero] |
2658 | The gods blame men for having vices, but they could have given us enough reason to avoid them [Cicero] |