19 ideas
| 4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
| 21953 | For Heidegger there is 'ontic' truth or 'uncoveredness', as in "he is a true friend" [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| 18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
| 4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
| 4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
| 4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
| 18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
| 18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
| 18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
| 18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
| 18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
| 18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
| 18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
| 18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
| 18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
| 18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
| 18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
| 18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
| 18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |