14 ideas
13737 | The empiricist says that metaphysics is meaningless, rather than false [Schlick] |
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |