Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Db (ideas)' and 'works'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

25 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
4465 Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
4037 Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
4686 Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
7415 Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
7414 What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
6696 The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
4687 Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6516 Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
4027 Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
4029 Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
24054 Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
3875 If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3876 If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
15473 How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2981 Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2985 Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7734 Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
7735 Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
3135 Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
2983 Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
4039 Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
3877 Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
6126 Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
3874 How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]
3873 An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]