15 ideas
17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
18528 | The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol] |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
16589 | Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol] |
16651 | God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol] |