14 ideas
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
1394 | Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers] |
1395 | Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers] |
1396 | We identify persons before identifying conscious states [Carruthers] |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |