Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Reference and Necessity' and 'Against Elections'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Nowadays sovereignty (once the basis of a state) has become relative [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
Today it seems almost impossible to learn the will of the people [Reybrouck]
There are no united monolothic 'peoples', and no 'national gut feelings' [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Technocrats may be efficient, but they lose legitimacy as soon as they do unpopular things [Reybrouck]
Technocrats are expert managers, who replace politicians, and can be long-term and unpopular [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the best compromise between legitimacy and efficiency [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
A referendum result arises largely from ignorance [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
You don't really govern people if you don't involve them [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
In the 18th century democratic lots lost out to elections, that gave us a non-hereditary aristocracy [Reybrouck]
Representative elections were developed in order to avoid democracy [Reybrouck]