Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Natural Kinds' and 'What do powers do when they are not manifested?'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
16943 Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
4037 Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
16949 Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
16939 Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
4027 Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
4029 Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
17996 Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
16948 Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
16945 We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
16944 Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
16941 Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
16940 Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
16933 Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
16934 General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
16938 To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
16947 Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
8486 Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
4039 Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
16932 Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
7375 Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
16935 If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
16936 Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
16937 You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
16942 It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]