Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Existence and Quantification' and 'Epistemology Naturalized'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

22 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
4037 Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
5745 Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
8789 Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
1635 Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
16966 Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
16965 All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
16963 Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
16964 Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
4216 Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe]
18966 Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
14490 You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
16961 In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
4027 Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
4029 Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
7627 You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine]
8871 We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson]
8826 If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine]
8827 Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine]
8899 Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
4039 Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
8898 Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
8900 In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]