Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'There is no question of physicalism', 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' and 'Philosophy as a way of life'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
9198 It is no longer possible to be a sage, but we can practice the exercise of wisdom [Hadot]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3123 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
9197 The logos represents a demand for universal rationality [Hadot]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3125 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
7855 Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
3106 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
3113 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
6120 Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
6121 There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
6122 No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3108 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
3110 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
3124 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
3119 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
9196 The pleasure of existing is the only genuine pleasure [Hadot]