13 ideas
| 13966 | Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames] |
| 20349 | Metaphysics aims at the essence of things, and a system to show how this explains other truths [Richardson] |
| 20351 | Metaphysics needs systems, because analysis just obsesses over details [Richardson] |
| 20350 | Metaphysics generalises the data, to get at the ontology [Richardson] |
| 13974 | If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames] |
| 13827 | Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz] |
| 13826 | Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz] |
| 13969 | Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames] |
| 13973 | A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames] |
| 13968 | Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames] |
| 13972 | Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames] |
| 20356 | Humans dominate because, unlike other animals, they have a synthesis of conflicting drives [Richardson] |
| 20366 | A mind that could see cause and effect as a continuum would deny cause and effect [Richardson] |