Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic'', 'Externalism/Internalism' and 'Vagueness: a global approach'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
9456 Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
9457 The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
23548 Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
23539 Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
9458 Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
9461 Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
23544 Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K]
23540 Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
23546 Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
23542 Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
23541 Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
23545 We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19712 Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19703 Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19705 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid]
19706 Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid]
19707 Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
19709 Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
19704 Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
19710 With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19711 Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
23547 It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
9460 Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette]
9459 Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
23543 We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K]