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All the ideas for 'Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic'', 'Explanatory Coherence' and 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver)'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
2: An explanation must wholly cohere internally, and with the new fact [Thagard, by Smart]
3: If an analogous pair explain another analogous pair, then they all cohere [Thagard, by Smart]
1: Coherence is a symmetrical relation between two propositions [Thagard, by Smart]
4: For coherence, observation reports have a degree of intrinsic acceptability [Thagard, by Smart]
5: Contradictory propositions incohere [Thagard, by Smart]
6: A proposition's acceptability depends on its coherence with a system [Thagard, by Smart]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette]
Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette]