12 ideas
9456 | Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette] |
9457 | The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette] |
9458 | Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette] |
9461 | Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette] |
14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
9460 | Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette] |
9459 | Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette] |
5990 | Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk] |