15 ideas
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
| 10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
| 10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |