16 ideas
| 10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
| 10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
| 10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
| 10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
| 10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
| 11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
| 11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
| 11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
| 11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
| 11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
| 11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
| 11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
| 10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |