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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On Denoting' and 'The Particle Zoo'

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67 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke]
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer]
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer]
"Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine]
Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]
Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey]
The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich]
Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell]
Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh]
Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A]
Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G]
Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell]
The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell]
Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell]
Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk]
Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell]
A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati]
Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell]
In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Relativity and Quantum theory give very different accounts of forces [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Thermodynamics introduced work and entropy, to understand steam engine efficiency [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Photons are B and W° bosons, linked by the Higgs mechanism [Hesketh]
Spinning electric charge produces magnetism, so all fermions are magnets [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons may have smaller components, bound by a new force [Hesketh]
Electrons are fundamental and are not made of anything; they are properties without size [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum mechanics is our only theory, and is very precise, and repeatedly confirmed [Hesketh]
Physics was rewritten to explain stable electron orbits [Hesketh]
Virtual particles can't be measured, and can ignore the laws of physics [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
Colour charge is positive or negative, and also has red, green or blue direction [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
The Standard Model omits gravity, because there are no particles involved [Hesketh]
In Supersymmetry the Standard Model simplifies at high energies [Hesketh]
Standard Model forces are one- two- and three-dimensional [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Quarks and leptons have a weak charge, for the weak force [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / e. Protons
Quarks rush wildly around in protons, restrained by the gluons [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / f. Neutrinos
Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, but decays produce them in huge numbers [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / c. Supersymmetry
To combine the forces, they must all be the same strength at some point [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
'Space' in physics just means location [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 8. Dark Matter
The universe is 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, 5% regular matter [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 9. Fine-Tuned Universe
If a cosmic theory relies a great deal on fine-tuning basic values, it is probably wrong [Hesketh]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell]