45 ideas
| 16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
| 3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
| 3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
| 3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
| 16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
| 3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
| 16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
| 2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
| 16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
| 16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
| 16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
| 16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
| 16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
| 16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
| 16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
| 3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
| 3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
| 4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
| 3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
| 3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
| 3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
| 16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
| 16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
| 3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
| 3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
| 3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| 3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
| 3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
| 3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
| 3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
| 3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
| 3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
| 3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
| 3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
| 3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
| 3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
| 3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
| 3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
| 3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
| 3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
| 3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
| 3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
| 16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |