67 ideas
326 | For relaxation one can consider the world of change, instead of eternal things [Plato] |
315 | Philosophy is the supreme gift of the gods to mortals [Plato] |
306 | Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato] |
6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
324 | Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato] |
20364 | The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato] |
6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
12042 | Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas] |
307 | Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato] |
318 | In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato] |
321 | For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato] |
317 | The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato] |
6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
334 | Only bird-brained people think astronomy is entirely a matter of evidence [Plato] |
6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
5962 | Plato says the soul is ordered by number [Plato, by Plutarch] |
330 | No one wants to be bad, but bad men result from physical and educational failures, which they do not want or choose [Plato] |
6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
316 | Music has harmony like the soul, and serves to reorder disharmony within us [Plato] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
332 | One should exercise both the mind and the body, to avoid imbalance [Plato] |
328 | Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant [Plato] |
322 | Intelligence is the result of rational teaching; true opinion can result from irrational persuasion [Plato] |
331 | Bad governments prevent discussion, and discourage the study of virtue [Plato] |
311 | The cosmos must be unique, because it resembles the creator, who is unique [Plato] |
310 | The creator of the cosmos had no envy, and so wanted things to be as like himself as possible [Plato] |
325 | We must consider the four basic shapes as too small to see, only becoming visible in large numbers [Plato] |
327 | There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine [Plato] |
314 | Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato] |
312 | Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato] |
309 | Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato] |
308 | If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato] |
6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |