18 ideas
8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |