99 ideas
| 15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
| 15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
| 15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
| 15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
| 15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
| 15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
| 15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
| 15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
| 15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
| 15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
| 15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
| 15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
| 15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
| 15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
| 15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
| 15350 | The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
| 15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
| 15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
| 15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
| 15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
| 15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
| 15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
| 15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
| 15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
| 15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
| 15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
| 15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
| 15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
| 15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
| 15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
| 15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
| 15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
| 15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
| 15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
| 15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
| 15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
| 15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
| 15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
| 15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
| 15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
| 15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
| 2392 | Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers] |
| 2393 | Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2394 | Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2398 | Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 16048 | Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K] |
| 15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
| 15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
| 15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
| 2401 | All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers] |
| 16424 | Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers] |
| 16425 | Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers] |
| 16426 | How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers] |
| 13956 | Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers] |
| 13963 | Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers] |
| 2407 | One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers] |
| 2390 | We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers] |
| 15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
| 2397 | 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers] |
| 2422 | The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers] |
| 2396 | Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers] |
| 2426 | Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers] |
| 2391 | Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers] |
| 2412 | Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2386 | Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers] |
| 2416 | What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2423 | Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers] |
| 2403 | Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2400 | Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers] |
| 2419 | Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers] |
| 2389 | Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers] |
| 2402 | It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers] |
| 2415 | In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers] |
| 2414 | When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers] |
| 2409 | Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers] |
| 2411 | Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers] |
| 2424 | It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers] |
| 2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2417 | Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers] |
| 2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
| 2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
| 2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
| 2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
| 2395 | Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
| 2429 | Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers] |
| 18403 | Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers] |
| 15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
| 14708 | Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter] |
| 13958 | The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers] |
| 2399 | Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers] |
| 13959 | The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers] |
| 13957 | Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 13961 | We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers] |
| 13962 | Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers] |
| 13960 | In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
| 16427 | Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers] |