12 ideas
12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |