Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Substance' and 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity'

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25 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins]
Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins]
A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins]
Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins]
If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins]
'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins]
Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker]
Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins]
Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker]