23 ideas
4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
21740 | I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell] |
21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
21746 | Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell] |
21747 | Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell] |
21743 | In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell] |
21742 | Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell] |
21745 | Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell] |
21744 | Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell] |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
22891 | We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon] |