13 ideas
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |