14 ideas
| 18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
| 19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
| 18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
| 18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
| 18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
| 18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
| 18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
| 6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
| 18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
| 6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
| 18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
| 18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
| 6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
| 468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |