Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Value Theory' and 'Semantic Relationism'

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33 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
15592 The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
15593 Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
15590 It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
15591 In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
15595 The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
15594 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
15599 Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
15603 I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15604 If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
15602 Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
15588 You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
15596 The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
15587 That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
15589 The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
15598 We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
15600 Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
15601 Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
15605 I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]