134 ideas
20383 | The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony [Nietzsche] |
4520 | I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants [Nietzsche] |
4545 | Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? [Nietzsche] |
4530 | Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal [Nietzsche] |
4523 | What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth [Nietzsche] |
4531 | Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity' [Nietzsche] |
4541 | Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche] |
18019 | People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor] |
17998 | Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor] |
18011 | Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor] |
18012 | Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor] |
18013 | Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor] |
18021 | Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor] |
18015 | The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor] |
18017 | If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor] |
18031 | If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor] |
18030 | A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor] |
18032 | Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor] |
18034 | Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor] |
18037 | Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor] |
18039 | If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor] |
18016 | Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor] |
18058 | Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor] |
18041 | Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor] |
18056 | Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor] |
18055 | In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor] |
18057 | 'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor] |
18059 | The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor] |
20357 | Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source [Nietzsche] |
4534 | 'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations [Nietzsche] |
4548 | Only because there is thought is there untruth [Nietzsche] |
5652 | True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Nietzsche, by Scruton] |
4508 | The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying [Nietzsche] |
4538 | Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations [Nietzsche] |
18040 | Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible [Magidor] |
20361 | We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist [Nietzsche] |
17997 | Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor] |
4533 | Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created [Nietzsche] |
20359 | The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming [Nietzsche] |
4525 | There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations [Nietzsche] |
4543 | There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts' [Nietzsche] |
4484 | Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction [Nietzsche] |
4546 | We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche] |
4544 | A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things' [Nietzsche] |
20362 | We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche] |
18060 | We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise [Magidor] |
4528 | For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche] |
4537 | We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche] |
4485 | Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche] |
4487 | A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche] |
4539 | The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche] |
4529 | All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful) [Nietzsche] |
4532 | We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time [Nietzsche] |
4486 | The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world [Nietzsche] |
4536 | It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing [Nietzsche] |
4551 | Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche] |
4527 | Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought [Nietzsche] |
20374 | Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche] |
18020 | Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor] |
23938 | Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking [Nietzsche] |
23939 | We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason [Nietzsche] |
18035 | Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor] |
18018 | To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor] |
18008 | Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor] |
18010 | 'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor] |
18053 | The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor] |
18000 | Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor] |
17999 | Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor] |
18014 | Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor] |
18001 | Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor] |
18036 | A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor] |
18051 | In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor] |
18043 | The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor] |
18042 | The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor] |
18047 | A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor] |
18048 | A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor] |
18049 | The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor] |
18050 | If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor] |
18054 | Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor] |
18024 | One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor] |
18023 | Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor] |
18025 | The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor] |
18026 | Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor] |
18028 | Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor] |
18029 | Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor] |
18022 | Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor] |
18027 | Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor] |
4554 | The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding [Nietzsche] |
4552 | There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it [Nietzsche] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
4521 | None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will [Nietzsche] |
4496 | 'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences [Nietzsche] |
20136 | There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will [Nietzsche] |
20358 | The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives [Nietzsche] |
20369 | The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia [Nietzsche] |
4506 | There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art [Nietzsche] |
4514 | The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality [Nietzsche] |
20370 | All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival [Nietzsche] |
20354 | The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values [Nietzsche] |
4505 | How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself? [Nietzsche] |
4509 | Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences! [Nietzsche] |
4500 | It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail [Nietzsche] |
4558 | We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms [Nietzsche] |
4550 | Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both [Nietzsche] |
4518 | The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
4519 | The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all [Nietzsche] |
4517 | Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak [Nietzsche] |
4560 | The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited [Nietzsche] |
4555 | The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will [Nietzsche] |
4494 | Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity [Nietzsche] |
4498 | 'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy' [Nietzsche] |
4493 | Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"? [Nietzsche] |
4511 | We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent [Nietzsche] |
4512 | Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities [Nietzsche] |
20372 | The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle [Nietzsche] |
4510 | A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one [Nietzsche] |
4515 | Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave [Nietzsche] |
4516 | Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being [Nietzsche] |
4559 | When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice') [Nietzsche] |
4557 | The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour [Nietzsche] |
4507 | The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason [Nietzsche] |
4501 | Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians [Nietzsche] |
4489 | If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals [Nietzsche] |
4513 | Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern [Nietzsche] |
4504 | Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals [Nietzsche] |
4495 | The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide [Nietzsche] |
4491 | In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes [Nietzsche] |
4542 | Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation [Nietzsche] |
4553 | We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche] |
4535 | A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal [Nietzsche] |
4497 | The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life [Nietzsche] |
4488 | Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality [Nietzsche] |
4502 | Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing [Nietzsche] |
4499 | Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class [Nietzsche] |