Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Limits of Contingency' and 'Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist'

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]