Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning' and 'Action'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
19306 It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
19304 The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
19307 If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
19309 Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
19303 Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
19305 The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
19310 High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
19308 We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
19311 In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
19312 Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
468 Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.]