16 ideas
18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |