24 ideas
9821 | A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett] |
9585 | Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege] |
17446 | Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege] |
9582 | Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege] |
9586 | In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege] |
9580 | Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege] |
9589 | Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege] |
9577 | The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege] |
9578 | If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege] |
12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
9581 | Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege] |
9579 | Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege] |
9587 | How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege] |
9588 | Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege] |
9583 | Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege] |
9584 | Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege] |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |